Abstract Recently, XACML is a popular access control policy language that is used widely in many applications. Policies in XACML are built based on many components over distributed resources. Due to the expressiveness of XACML, it is not trivial for policy administrators to understand the overall effect and consequences of XACML policies they have written. In this paper we show a mechanism and a tool how to analyses big access control policies sets such as (i) incompleteness policies, (ii) conflicting policies, and (iii) unreachable policies. To detect these problems we present a method using Answer Set Programming (ASP) in the context of XACML 3.0.
Introduction
XACML (eXtensible Access Control Markup Language) is an OASIS 1 standard that describes both a policy language and a query/response language for access control policies. It has been used in many different applications range over health care information systems, transport systems to banking information systems 2 . The policy language is used to express access control requirements (who can access what when) over distributed resources and the query/response language is used to query whether a particular access should be allowed (request) and to answer the query (response). Access control policies in XACML are built based on many components and combined using a particular combining algorithm.
Due to the expressiveness of XACML, it is not trivial for policy administrators to understand the overall effect and consequences of XACML policies they have written. The problem becomes more prevalent if there are no mechanisms/automated 1 tools to analyse big chunk of policies. Several problems might occur in developing access control policies such as incomplete policies and conflicting policies. Moreover, detecting unreachable policies might help policy administrators to remove unused policies in order to make the set of policies slimmer and make it easier to be maintained.
Analysing Incomplete Policies. It is high probable that policy developers do not define all possible situations that might occur. Incomplete access control policies might lead to a security problem. Following we present a probable scenario how an intruder can use this security hole to get an access. In XACML, PDP (Policy Decision Point) computes a decision based on administrated policies in a database, but the final decision is made by PEP (Policy Enforcement Point). There are two PEP-biased:
1. Permit-biased PEP: if the decision from PDP is deny, then the PEP shall deny assess. All other decisions shall result in the permission of access. 2. Deny-biased PEP: if the decision from PDP is permit, then the PEP shall permit the access. All other decisions shall result in the denial of access.
In this case, there is a possibility that an intruder can get an access unintentionally by trying to query so that the response is no policy is applicable. Using Permit-biased PEP, the decision will let the intruder have access to the system.
Analysing Conflicting Policies. Conflicting policies can have serious consequences
and may lead to unauthorized access. Basically, in XACML, conflicting decision never occurs since all policies are combined with a particular combining algorithm that only returns one decision. However it is interesting to analyse conflict in between policies for example different department can have different decision. By analysing conflict, the policy makers can rethink again whether they made correct policies.
Analysing Unreachable Policies. Analysisng unreachable policies helps policy administrators to reduce the size of the set of policies. A policy is unreachable if for all request it never gives decision i.e., either it always not applicable or there is another policy that overrides its decision. It is safe to remove unreachable policies because their decisions never influence the final decisions.
To address the above concern we propose a logic-based XACML analysis framework using logic programs (LPs) and answer set semantics. Answer Set Programming (ASP) has become a popular approach to solve combinatorial problems declaratively. There are several efficient implementations of answer set solvers, such as ASSAT 3 , clasp 4 , Cmodels 5 , Smodels 6 , and many more. We present in this paper a method using ASP to solve those problems explained previously in the context of XACML 3.0 [5] , the most recent version of XACML.
Outline. In this paper first we explain the model and semantics of XACML 3.0 in Sect. 2. Then we describe the mapping of XACML 3.0 components into logic programs P X AC M L in Sect. 3. Next we show how to analyse access control policies such as incompleteness, conflicting and reachability XACML policies in Sect. 4. We end the paper with conclusion and future work.
XACML Model and Semantics
In this section we briefly describe the XACML policy language and XACML query language model. First we show the faithfully abstract syntax XACML 3.0. Then we present a semantics of XACML 3.0 without considering indeterminate values. Our argument is that we evaluate access control properties to a set of policies in statically. Hence, indeterminate values which only occur when there are errors during evaluation process do not give impact to our analysis. At the end of this section we show the semantics of XACML combining algorithms which are used for composing several access control policies.
Abstract Syntax of XACML 3.0
We summarize the syntax of XACML 3.0 in Table 1 . To make the notation clear we use bold font for non-terminal symbols, typewriter font for terminal symbols and identifiers and values are written in italic font. Moreover, <XACML Component> denotes the symbol for XACML component. We use the star symbol (*) to indicate that there is zero or more of the preceding element and we use the plus symbol ( + ) to indicate that there is one or more of the preceding element. We assume that each policy must have a unique identifier (ID). There are three levels of policies in XACML, namely <PolicySet>, <Policy> and <Rule>. <PolicySet> or <Policy> can act as the root of a set of access control policies while <Rule> is a single entity that describes one particular access control policy. Through this paper, we assume that <PolicySet> is the root of the set of access control policies.
XACML Policy Components
<PolicySet> and <Policy> have the same characteristic, i.e., they are containers for a sequence of <PolicySet>, <Policy> or <Rule>. A <PolicySet> contains either a sequence of <PolicySet> or a sequence of <Policy> while a <Policy> only can contains a sequence of <Rule>. The sequence of <PolicySet>, <Policy> or <Rule> is combined with a particular combining algorithm. There are four common combining algorithms defined in XACML 3.0, namely permit-overrides (po), deny-overrides (do), first-applicable (fa) and only-one-applicable (ooa).
A <Rule> describes an individual access control policy. It regulates whether an access should be permitted or denied. All <PolicySet>, <Policy> and <Rule> are applicable whenever their <Target> matches with the <Request>. When the <Rule>'s <Target> matches with the <Request>, then the applicability of the <Rule> is refined by its <Condition>.
A <Target> is a combination of <Match> elements. Each <Match> element describes an attribute that a <Request> should match in order to activate a policy. There are four attribute categories in XACML 3.0, namely subject attribute, action attribute, resource attribute and environment attribute. The subject attribute is the entity requesting access, e.g., a file system, a workstation, etc. The action attribute defines the type of access requested, e.g., to read, to write, to delete, etc. The resource attribute is a data, service or system components. The environment attribute can optionally provide additional information.
A <Request> contains a set of attributes information about access request. A <Request> can contain additional information such as external state condition (e.g. the current time, current temperature, etc).
XACML 3.0 Formal Semantics
The evaluation of XACML policies against a given request starts from the evaluation of <Match> elements and continued bottom-up until the evaluation of <PolicySet> as the root element. We use the . notation to map XACML elements into their values (see the summary in Tabel 2). Evaluation of <Match> into { m, nm }. Given a <Request> Q, the evaluation of <Match> M is as follows
Evaluation of <AllOf> into { m, nm }. Given a <Request> Q, the evaluation of
where each M i is a <Match> element.
Evaluation of <AnyOf> into { m, nm }. Given a <Request> Q, the evaluation of
A i is as follows
where each A i is a <AllOf> element.
E i is as follows
where each E i is a <AnyOf> element. Empty <Target>, indicated by Null always evaluated to m.
Evaluation of <Condition> into { t, f }. Given a <Request> Q, the evaluation of <Condition> C is as follows
Note: The eval is an unspecified function that returns { t, f }.
where e ∈ { p, d }, T is a <Target> element and C is a <Condition> element. CombID] is as follows
where T is a <Target> element, and each R i is a <Rule> element. We use R to denote
The combining algorithm denoted by CombID will be explained in Sect. 2.3. CombID] is as follows
where T is a <Target> element and each P i is a <Policy> (or <PolicySet>) element. We use P to denote < < P 1 (Q), . . . , P n (Q) > >.
XACML Combining Algorithms
There are four common combining algorithms defined in XACML 3.0, namely permitoverrides (po), deny-overrides (do), first-applicable (fa) and only-one-applicable (ooa). The permit-overrides combining algorithm takes permit decision as the most priority than deny decision while the deny-overrides combining algorithm takes deny decision over permit. Likewise their names, the first-applicable combining algorithm return the first <Rule> (or <Policy> or <PolicySet>) that is applicable (either permit (p) or deny(d) value) and the only-one-applicable combining algorithm return a decision whenever only one <Rule> (or <Policy> or <PolicySet>) which is applicable, otherwise it returns not applicable (na).
Permit-Overrides
The permit-overrides combining algorithm is intended for those cases where a permit decision should have priority over a deny decision. Let S =< < v 1 , v 2 , . . . , v n > > be a sequence of policy values. The permit-overrides combining algorithm, po , is defined as follows
Deny-Overrides The deny-overrides is the mirror of permit-overrides whereas the deny decision has more priority over a permit decision.
Let S =< < v 1 , v 2 , . . . , v n > > be a sequence of policy values. The deny-overrides combining algorithm, do , is defined as follows
First-Applicable The result of first-applicable algorithm is the first Rule, Policy or PolicySet element in the sequence whose is applicable.
Let S =< < v 1 , v 2 , . . . , v n > > be a sequence of policy values. The first-applicable combining algorithm, fa , is defined as follows
Only-One-Applicable The result of the only-one-applicable combining algorithm ensures that one and only one policy is applicable. If no policy applies, then the result is na, but if more than one policy is applicable, then the result is idt. When exactly one policy is applicable, the result of the combining algorithm is the result of evaluating the single applicable policy. Please note that we do not use idt in this step. Hence, all of idt value is converted to na.
. . , v n > > be a sequence of policy values. The only-one-applicable combining algorithm, ooa , is defined as follows
Mapping XACML into Logic Programs
First we explain the syntax of logic program (LP) in this section. Then we show the transforming XACML 3.0 into LP. The semantics of LP is explained in the following section when we use it for analysis purposes.
Syntax of Logic Programs
We start by introducing some notations and terminologies which we will use through the paper. First-Order Language. We consider an alphabet consisting of (finite or countably infinite) disjoint sets of variables, constants, function symbols, predicate symbols, connectives { not, ∧, ← }, punctuation symbols { "(", ", ", ")", "." } and special symbols { ⊤, ⊥ }. In this paper we will use upper case letters to denote variables and lower case letters to denote constants, function and predicate symbols. Terms, atoms, literals and formulae are defined as usual. The language given by an alphabet consists of the set of all formulae constructed from the symbols occurring in the alphabet. Logic Programs. A rule is an expression of the form
where A is either an atom or ⊥ and each We refer the rule as a constraint when A is ⊥. One should observe that the body of a rule must not be empty. A rule of the form A ← ⊤ is called a fact.
A logic program (LP) is a finite set of rules. ground(P) denotes the set of all ground instances of the program P.
XACML Transformations
The transformation of XACML components is based on the semantics of each component explained in Sect. 2.2. First we recall the syntax of each component then we show how the transformation is.
M i be an <AllOf> component where each M i is a <Match> component. The transformation of <AllOf> A into LP P A is as follows (see (2) for <AllOf> evaluation)
A i be an <AnyOf> component where each A i is an <AllOf> component. The transformation of <AnyOf> E into LP P E is as follows (see (3) for <AnyOf> evaluation)
<Target> Transformation. XACML Syntax: Let T = n i=1 E i be a <Target> component where each E i is an <AnyOf> component. The transformation of <Target> T into LP P T is as follows (see (4) for <Target> evaluation)
<Condition> Transformation. XACML Syntax: We assume that the <Condition> element is a boolean formula which the evaluation of <Condition> is based on eval function. The transformation of <Condition> C into LP P C is as follows
In our previous example of <Rule> r1, the <Condition> cond(r1) is patient.id(X) /\ patient _ record.id(X). The possibility of eval function is like following
The error(pat ient_id(X )) and error(pat ient_r ecor d_id(X )) indicate possible errors might occur, e.g., the system could not connect to the database so that the system does not know the ID of the patient.
<Rule> Transformation. XACML Syntax: Let R id = [E, T, C] be a <Rule> component where E ∈ { p, d }, T is a <Target> and C is a <Condition>. The transformation of <Rule> R id into LP P R id is as follows (see (6) for <Rule> evaluation) CombID] be a <Policy> component where T is a <Target>, < R 1 , . . . , R n > be a sequence of <Rule> elements and CombID be a combining algorithm identifier. In order to indicate that the <Policy> contains <Rule> R i , thus for every <Rule> R i contained in P id = [T, < < R 1 , . . . , R n > >, CombID], P P id also contains:
Next, we do a transformation for <Policy> P id and add into LP P P id is as follows (see (7) for <Policy> evaluation)
We write formulae dec(P id , R, V ), V = na to make sure that there is a <Rule> in the <Policy> that is not evaluated to na. We do this to avoid a return value from a combining algorithm that is not naeven tough all of the <Rule> elements are evaluated to na.
<PolicySet> Transformation. The transformation of <PolicySet> is similar to the transformation of <Policy> component.
XACML Syntax: Let PS id = [T, < < P 1 , . . . , P n > >, CombID] be a <Policy> component where T is a <Target>, < P 1 , . . . , P n > be a sequence of <Policy> (or <PolicySet>) elements and CombID be a combining algorithm identifier. The transformation of <PolicySet> PS id into logic program PS P id is as follows For every <Policy> (or <PolicySet>) contained in PS id = [T, < < P 1 , . . . , P n > >, CombID], P PS id also contains:
And we following rules into P PS id val(PS id , na) ← val(T, nm). val(PS id , na) ← val (P 1 , na) , . . . , val(P n , na). val(PS id , E) ← val(T, m), dec(PS id , P, V ), V = na, algo(CombID, PS id , E).
Combining Algorithm Transformation
We use P for an variable of <Policy> identifier and R, R 1 and R 2 for variables of <Rule> identifiers. In case the evaluation of <PolicySet>, the input P is for <PolicySet> identifier, R, R 1 and R 2 are for <Policy> (or <PolicySet>) identifiers.
Permit-Overrides Transformation. Let P po be a LP obtained by permit-overrides combining algorithm transformation (see (9) for the permit-overrides combining algorithm semantics). P po contains:
Deny-Overrides Transformation. Let P be a LP obtained by deny-overrides combining algorithm transformation (see (10) for the permit-overrides combining algorithm semantics). P po contains:
First-Applicable Transformation. Let P fa be a logic program obtained by firstapplicable combining algorithm transformation (see (11) for the first-applicable combining algorithm semantics). For each <Policy> (or <PolicySet>) which uses first-applicable combining algorithm, P id = [T, < < R 1 , . . . , R n > >, fa], P P id contains:
. . .
Only-One-Applicable Transformation. Let P ooa be a logic program obtained by only-one-applicable combining algorithm transformation (see (12) for the only-oneapplicable combining algorithm semantics). P ooa contains:
E), not not_one_appl ica bl e(P). algo(ooa, P, na)
← not_one_appl ica bl e(P).
Policy Analysis
We use the semantics of LP P X AC M L -the result from transforming XACML components into series of LPs -to analyse access control policy properties. In this section, we present three policy analysis cases namely analysing on incompleteness policies, conflicting policies and unreachable policies. The completeness and free of conflict properties have been introduces by Samarati and di Vimercati in [7] and formalized using Belnap four-valued logic [2] by Bruns and Huth in [3] . In this section we show how we present ASP programs to capture those properties 7 . Our intention is to have an automatic tool that shows XACML formalization and in the same time it can be used to help policy administrators to analyse their policies sets.
Semantics of Logic Programs
The declarative semantics of a logic program is given by a model-theoretic semantics of formulae in the underlying language. The formal definition of answer set semantics can be found in many literatures like in [1, 4] .
Interpretations and Models
The Herbrand Universe U L for a language L is the set of all ground terms that can be formed from the constants and function symbols appearing in L. The Herbrand base B L for a language L is the set of all ground atoms that can be formed by using predicate symbols from L and ground terms from U L as arguments. By B P we denote the Herbrand base for language underlying the program P. When the context is clear, we are safe to omit P.
An interpretation I of a program P is a mapping from the Herbrand base B P to the set of truth value true and false ({ ⊤, ⊥ }). All atoms belong to interpretation I are mapped to ⊤. All atoms which does not occur in I are mapped to ⊥.
The truth value of arbitrary formulae under some interpretation can be determined from a truth table as usual (see Table 3 ). 
The logical value of ground formulae can be derived from Table 3 in the usual way. A formula φ is then true under interpretation I , denoted by I (φ) = ⊤, if all its ground instances are true in I ; it is false under interpretation I , denoted by I (φ) = ⊥, if there is a ground instance of φ that is false in I .
Let I be an interpretation. I satisfies formula φ, denoted by I |= φ, if I (φ) = ⊤. For a program P, we say I satisfies of P, denoted by I |= P, if I satisfies for every clause in P.
Let I be a collection of interpretations. Then an interpretation I is I is called minimal in I if and only if there is no interpretation J in I such that J I . An interpretation I is called least in I if and only if I ⊆ J for any interpretation J in I. A model M of a program P is called minimal (respectively least) if it is minimal (respectively least) among all models of P.
The answer set semantics of logic program P assigns to P a collection of answer sets -interpretations of ground(P). An interpretation I of ground(P) is an answer set for P if I is minimal (w.r.t. set inclusion) among the interpretations satisfying the rules of
A logic program can have a unique, many or none answer set(s). Therefore, we show that programs with a particular characteristic are guaranteed to have unique answer set.
Acyclic Programs. We say that a program is acyclic when there is no cycle in the program.The acyclicity in the program is guaranteed by the existence of a certain fixed assignment of natural numbers to atoms that is called a level mapping.
A level mapping for a program P is a function
where N is the set of natural numbers and B P is the Herbrand base for P. We extend the definition of level mapping to a mapping from ground literals to natural numbers by setting l(not A) = l(A). Let P be a logic program and l be a level mapping for P. P is acyclic with respect to l if for every clause A ← B 1 , . . . , B m , not B m+1 , . . . , not B n in ground(P) we find l(A) > l(B i ) for all i with 1 ≤ i ≤ n P is acyclic if it is acyclic with respect to some level mapping.
Acyclic programs are guaranteed to have unique answer sets [1] .
XACML Semantics Based On ASP Semantics
We can see from Sect. 3 that all of the XACML 3.0 transformation programs are acyclic. Thus, it is guaranteed that P X AC M L has unique answer set. 
Analysis on Incompleteness Policies
A set of policies is complete if it always returns a decision given for any request. XACML defines that there is one <PolicySet> as the root of a set of policies. Therefore, we formally express completeness property as follows:
where Q for <Request> and PS root is the root of <PolicySet> element in the set of policies.
We say that there is a gap in the policy set if it is not complete. Hence, we formally express gap property as follows:
It is equal to
The idea of having gap property is to have a logic program that can show answer sets whenever there is gap in the policies. We use the answer sets as the witnesses of the incompleteness policies.
In order to check gap property we should generate all possible values restored in the database for each attribute. Each attribute only possible to have one value. Thus, we use cardinality constraint [8, 10] and the encoding is as follows:
The intuitive meaning of the above cardinality constrains is that, for each subject in the database, exactly one instance of subject request is generated. The conversion holds for other attributes.
We say there is a gap whenever we can find a request that makes value of the PS root is na. Here is the encoding:
We force ASP solver to find a gap by putting a constraint ⊥ ← not gap. The answer sets of program P = P X AC M L ∪ P generat e_one ∪ P gap are the witnesses that the set of policies encoded in P X AC M L is incomplete. When there is no model satisfies the program then we are sure that the set of policies captures all of possible cases.
Analysis on Conflicting Policies
A conflict never occurs in XACML because the structure of policies where there is only one <PolicySet> as the root of all of policies and all of others policies are combined by combining algorithm. Each combining algorithm returns a single decision either permit or deny and never return both decisions in the same time. However, it is still interesting to know whether there are two <Rule> give conflict decisions. We formally define a conflict is as follows:
In order to compute whether there is a conflict in the set of policies, we encode a logic program for conflict property as follows:
The same as gap condition, we force ASP solver to find a conflict by putting a constraint ⊥ ← not conflict.
A conflict can be analysis whenever P = P X AC M L ∪ P generat e_one ∪ P conflict returns answer sets. The returning models are evidences where the conflict between <Rule> occurs. We conclude that a set of policies is conflict-free if and only if program P is unsatisfied, i.e., there is no returned model.
Analysis on Reachability Policies
A policy is reachable if there is a request such that the decision is made based on this policy. Usually in a big set of policies, there is a policy that is not reachable. This happens because policies are built based on several components and combined together. We formally define a reachability property as follows:
where Q is <Request> element and R is <Rule> element.
The encoding of reachability property in logic program is as follows:
Formally, a policy is not reachable if for every request either:
1. It always return na.
unreachable(R):
2. in case of permit-overrides combining algorithm, a policy is not reachable if its decision is deny but the final decision of the root policy is permit.
3. In case of deny-overrides combining algorithm, a policy is not reachable if its decision is permit but the final decision of the root policy is deny.
In case of only-one-applicable combining algorithm, a policy is not reachable if it is applicable policy but the final decision of the root policy is not applicable. This indicates that there is another policy that is also applicable.
In case of first-applicable combining algorithm, a policy is not reachable if it is applicable but there is another policy in the same collection that is in the earlier of the sequence that is also applicable. First of all we should generate all possible attributes. This time, the encoding is different with program P generat e_one because we want to generate all possible attributes, not only one. Hence, we do not use cardinality constraint in this encoding. Here is the encoding: P generat e_all : sub jec t(X ) ← sub jec t_d b(X ).
ac t ion(X ) ← ac t ion_d b(X ). r esour ce(X ) ← r esour ce_d b(X ). envi r onment(X ) ← envi r onment_d b(X ).
Following we translate each unreachable condition into logic program P not_reachable : not_reachable(R) ← not reachable(R). not_reachable(R) ← val(P, p), dec(P, R, d). not_reachable(R) ← val(P, d), dec(P, R, p). not_reachable(R) ← val(P, na), dec(P, R, E), E = na.
In the case of first-applicable combining algorithm, there is a possibility a policy returns permit and the final decision is also permit, but, the permit of the final decision comes from the earlier applicable policy. Hence, we should take care of the ordering of policies. We need to add extra rules in the program transformations such as: for every <Rule> R i contained in P id = [T, < < R 1 , . . . , R n > >, fa], P P id also contains:
Here we add to our P not_reachable not_reachable(R j ) ← dec(P id , R i , E, I ), dec(P id , R j , E ′ , J ), E = na, E ′ = na, I < J .
To check unreachable property we add to our program P not_reachable :
not_reachable ← not_reachable(R). ⊥ ← not not_reachable.
We force ASP solver to find unreachable policies by putting a constraint ⊥ ← not not_reachable. When not_reachable(R) is in the answer set of P = P X AC M L ∪ P generat e_all ∪ P reachable ∪ P not_reachable then it is safe to remove policy R from the set because it is unreachable.
Conclusion and Future Work
We have shown a mechanism to map XACML 3.0 components into logic programs. Using the advantages of ASP technique to solve combinatorial problems efficiently we have presented ASP programs to capture analysing in access control policies incompleteness property, conflicting property and unreachability property. Our intention is to have an automatic tool that both showing formalization and also help policy administrators to analyse their policies sets. For future work, we would like to analyse conflict in attribute based like in Singh's work [9] . We also would like to extend our work to handle Role-Based Access Control (RBAC) [6] and see the conflict might occurs between different roles.
In order to reduce the policies, we could inspect redundancy between policies. We should find a subset of policies that might capture the whole possible decisions might happen in all policies. Thus, we could have smaller set than the original policies set.
